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I.

INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY1

During the last half of the twentieth century, the global
economy has been undergoing monumental change, as the world is
dividing into three regional economic zones:
North America.;

the Pacific rim;

and, the European Community (EC).

Though it is

important to analyze the relationships between these three
economic players, it is also

~ecessary

to study the relationships

among the member nations of each bloc to determine the effect on
the nations participating in the bloc as well as the activities
of the single; unit.

The tight economic relationship formed when

several sovereign nations form a union, like the EC, has a great
impact on each country's domestic economic policies.

In

~

Economics of European Integration, Willem Molle states that,
Interdependence of national economies means
that developments on the national scale are
apt to have spillover effects in partner
countries, each country giving impulses and
feeling the impact of impulses in other
countries (151).
So, when nations form an economic union, each country'g
domestic economic decisions affect the other nations in the
group, as well as the union's success in achieving economic goals
as a single unit.
Following this idea of intra-bloc study, I focus on two
interrelated events in this project.

First, I examine inflation

rates in the EC from 1971 through 1990.

This time period permits

me to analyze inflation rates in the EC during a period when
three different exchange rate systems were implemented in the

Comnrunity.

Moreover, I determine one aspect of Germany's role in

the Community, before German unification, by noting the pattern
of inflation rates of the EC members relative to German inflation
rates.
has

Second, I examine the extent to which German unification

affect~d

the pattern of inflation rates in the EC. by

studying Ger'man and EC members' inflation ra.tes after German
unification.
A.

HISTOR¥ OF EXCHANGE RATES IN THE Ee

The early 1970's were not good years for the countries that
now make up the EC, as they experienced high inflation and
unemployment rates, along with low levels of economic growth and
investment (Tsoukalis, 36).

In April 1972, just a short time

before the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1973, the EC implemented
an exchange rate system to encourage exchange rate stability.
This new system was known as the snake and its objective was to
" ... maintain bilateral exchange rates within relatively narrow
margins" (Tsoukalis, 36-39).

The EC countries who were members

of the snake mechanism implemented a band of 2.25%, which allowed
the currencies to fluctuate (plus or minus 2.25%) around an
exchange rate parity (Harrop, 181).

The EC countries wanted

exchange rate stability in order to facilitate the trade of goods
among countries, help the EC member nations accomplish their
individual goals of reducing domestic inflation, and provide for
the integration of capital markets and eventually monetary union
(Harrop, 178-179).
However, the success of the snake was short-lived and by
2

1976, this mechanism only contained five members (W. Germany,
Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg) and became known
as the mini-snake (Bulmer, 63).

Clearly, a new exchange rate

mechanism had to be implemented in the Community if exchange rate
stability was to be achieved.

In 1979, the EC expanded on the

idea of the snake mechanism and formed the European Monetary
System (EMS);

The EMS is classified as a "fixed exchange rate

with a band" (Salvatore,611).2
Like the snake, the EMS creates an environment for stable
'.

exchange rates, as well as forces "alignment of inflation rates"
(Molle, 158-159).

Though similar to the snake, the EMS differs

in that, " ... the European Currency Unit (ECU) has replaced the
earlier units of account ... it provides the basis of the
divergence indicator ... it is a means of settlement between
monetary authorities of the Community" (Harrop, 185).
B.

GERMANY AS THE EC' S TARGET ECONOMY

Before 'German unification, which officially took place in
1990, W. Germany was

~

main economic and policy-making force in

the EC. This fact is noted in The Federal Republic of Germany and
the European Community, "The Federal Republic of Germany is the
strongest national economy in the European Cowfiunity" (Bulmer,
1).

The beginning of W. Germany's rise to power is associated

with the establishment of the snake mechanism, and increased as
the EC established new forms of an exchange rate mechanism
(Tsoukalis, 38-39).

In fact, according to Jeffrey Harrop, before

unification, "W. Germany is the dominant economy in the Community
3

and the pivotal force, so that economic policy in the EC is
influenced very much by the German example" (Harrop, 207).
During this period, W. Germany became the target economy
with respect to inflation of the EC members for several reasons.
First, W. Germany had a strong currency which the other economies
could use as a peg.

The EC countries wanted to use Germany's

.

discipline to help control their own inflation because they knew
W.Germany would not inflate.

Since W. Germany would not inflate,

the fixed exchange rate system with a band forced the other
countries to reduce their inflation, given the large amount of
trade between W. Germany and the other EC members.
because the others

~

In addition,

W. Germany would not inflate, they would

begin to change their policies quickly when exchange rate
pressures arose because they knew Germany would not change its
policy to allow more domestic inflation.

If these EC countries

had refused to change their policies quickly, sooner or later,
they would have had to drop out of the exchange rate mechanism.
In addition, Germany's large economic size and wealth enabled it
to help EC members make these adjustments.

Finally, the EC

members wanted to use W. Germany's discipline to help control
their oml inflation, because W. Germany had strong policies to
control its own domestic inflation (Tsoukalis, 184).
W. Germany was successful at keeping inflation low for two
reasons.

First, Germany feared inflation as it recalled its own

experiences of the early 1900·s.

During the Weimar government,

inflation took hold of the German economy.
4

From 1921 through

•

1923, Germany experienced severe hyperinflation.

This disaster

began because the German government printed money in order to
finance its expenditures.

As a result, by 1923, prices escalated

to 1.5 trillion times greater than their 1914 level (Childs, .38
and Kohn, 1).

During this period, inflation rates were rising by

the hour, and the longer people held their cash, the more value
it lost.
deeply

Af~er

fea~ed

its experience with hyperinflation, Germany

the threat of inflation, so it was willing to make

other sacrifices, such as higher unemployment, to ensure low
rates of inflation.
Due to its historical experiences, W. Germany established
the Bundesbank, the central bank of W. Germany, which was made
independent from elected government officials and from changing
political interests (Bulmer, 62).

And "By law, the primary.task

of the central bank is to 'safeguard the currency' (prevent
inflation)" (Sandholtz, 12).

So, prior to German unification, it

is understandable why the EC members believed Germany would not
inflate.
In addition, because Germany had been plagued with
hyperinflation in the past, it took an early leadership role in
the Community, partly to help protect its own economic interests
while advancing the interests of the EC.

For example, as early

as 1969, W. German representatives to the EC declared that in
order to keep inflation under control, it was first necessary to
focus on convergence of economic factors, such as inflation,
among EC member countries, and second, monetary union.

5

German

•

leaders emphasized that if the EC concentrated on monetary union
and then economic convergence, there would be a greater risk of
promoting high inflation (Bulmer, 62-62).
C_

GERMAN UNIFICATION

It is understandable why the EC countries expected Germany
to keep low inflation rates and a stable economy
unification.

prio~

to

However, German unification has upset the stability

of the German economy.

Consequently, unification has cast-doubt

on Germany's role as an economic leader in the EC.
The momentous event of German unification actually was
several years in the making and was realized as a legitimate
possibility

i~

the late 1980's.

The speculation came true in

July of 1990 when intra-German monetary union took place, while
formal unification was declared on October 3, 1990 (Burstein,
209-210) .
Because unification was such a huge undertakiDg, it had a
tremendous impact on the state of the economy as well as on the
economic policies of the new country.

An early effect of German

unification was an increase in public spending.

In 1991 W.

Germany transferred nearly DM 140 billion to E. Germany in an
attempt to rebuild and update its economy.

This transfer put the

public sector deficit at an estimated 4.5% of GNP (Barrell, 150
153;

and, The Economist, 7 Dec. 1991, 96).

Germany's GDP growth faltered.

In addition,

From 1981 through 1990, W.

Germany's average GDP growth rate was 2.3% per year.

At the end

of 1992, W. Germany's GDP growth had fallen to -0.2%, while as of
6

•

quarter three of 1993, it was at -1.4% (The Economist:
1994 and 20 Mar. 1993, back cover).

5 Feb.

The increase in deficit

spending along with the need to stimulate the economy has
resulted in.increasing levels of inflation for unified Germany,
where quarterly annualized inflation rates have reached a high of
nearly 8% (DSC Data Services-).
As a result of the current German economic conditions,
Helmut Schlesinger, head of the Bundesbank, has stated that
Germany's top priority now is to regain a stable national economy
and not its policy effects on EC members.

Schlesinger defends

his stance by emphasizing that, "Ther'e' s no possibility of
helping our

p~rtner

countries by allowing more inflation in

Germany" (Javetski, 34-35).

This statement illustrates Germany's

./

current lack of control over inflation.

II _
A.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESI S
THEORY

The implementation of a fixed exchange rate system is
expected to cause inflation rate convergence in the EC.

This

expectation is based on the economic theory of fixed exchange
rates.

To understand the relationship between fixed exchange

rates and inflation rate convergence, let us examine the
international currency market under a pure fixed exchange rate
system.

The results can later be adapted to the EC system of a

fixed exchange rate with a band.
The following example explains step-by-step what happens
7
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when inflation rates differ between countries which operate under
a fixed exchange rate system.

For simplicity, France and Germany

are the only two countries in this model.

Assume that France is

experiencing a higher rate of inflation than Germany because of
its use of expansionary monetary policy.

Since prices in France

are rising, French goods are, now relatively expensive compared to
German goods.

To French consumers, the relatively cheap German

goods now

more attractive compared to French goods, while to

~ook

German consumers, French goods now look relatively unattractive.
Consequently, France increases its imports from Germany.

When

French consumers buy more German goods, they need more marks in
order to pay for them.

They pay for those marks wi th francs.

Therefore on world currency markets, demand for German marks
increases, and supply of French francs increases.

Because French

goods are now relatively expensive to Germans, Germany decreases
its imports from France.

This decrease in French imports leads

to a decrease in demand for French francs and a decrease in
supply of German marks.
The following graph represents the international currency
market for French francs.

8
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ER1 is the beginning exchange rate and is determined by

the equilibrium of the. supply and demand curves for French francs
(5 and D).
supply of

As France increases its imports from Germany, its
fra~cs

increases as explained above.

This increase in

supply of francs is shoM1 by an outward shift of the supply curve
to S' _

In addition, because Germany's desire for French imports

decreases, its demand for French francs also decreases.
shown by a downward shift in the demand curve to D'.

This is

From these

shifted supply and demand curves, the new equilibrium exchange
rate is ER2.

The value of the franc has fallen relative to the

mark.
If France and Germany operate under a fixed exchange rate
system, then the exchange rate is not allowed to fall.
Consequently, France must defend the franc, so the French
government buys francs and sells marks.

The French government

will continue this intervention until the exchange rate returns
to its original level, ER1.

This process is shown on the graph

by an outward shift of the demand curve, to D", which pushes the
9

•

exchange rate backup to its original level.
This process of government intervention appears to be a
feasible solution to defending a currency under a fixed exchange
rate system, but it has one shortcoming which makes it
impossible.

The French government cannot continually buy francs

by selling marks because it will eventually run out of marks!
Under a fixed exchange rate system, the country with the
higher inflation, France, has a serious problem because it· cannot
continually defend its currency.

However, the country with the

lower rate of inflation, Germany, can intervene in this market by
selling marks, because it will not run out of marks!
Consequently,; France

~

be fiscally responsible and tighten its

domestic policy in order to reduce its inflation.
This theory demonstrates why under a fixed exchange rate
system, countries may not have persistent differing rates of
inflation.

Although the EC does not operate under a truly fixed

exchange rate system, this theory is still applicable to the EC
in explaining why the inflation rates of its member nations
should converge.

Because there is a band of fluctuation around

the fixed exchange rate in the EC, slight tempO:t'ary inflation
rate differences may be tolerated;

however, inflation rates

should stiil converge within narrow limits.
B.

HYPOTHESES

Due to the evolution of the exchange rate systems in the EC,
as well as the differences in the German economy before and after
unification, I have formed two hypotheses.
10

First, I test the

•

hypothesis that before 1991, the implementation of a fixed
exchange rate system with a band in the EC along with a strong,
stable German economy, led to inflation rate convergence by the
EC member nations to German inflation rates.

Second, I test the

hypothesis that German unification, which has had a destabilizing
effect en the German domestic economy through increased deficit
spending and declining growth rates, resulted in inflation rate
divergence. from Germany by the EC member nations, because ,the EC
member nations can no longer be assured that Germany will
maintain low rates of inflation.
III.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The analysis which tests my hypotheses uses annual and
quarterly inflation rates from 1970 through 1993.

The inflation

rates are calculated from GDP deflator data, which are taken from
the World Tables 1992, published by the World Bank, and

ISM

Global Economic Data Base as of December 1993, published by DSC
Data

Servic~6.

The hypotheses are tested by using several

graphs, two F-tests, and one regression model.
IV.

A.

RESULTS'
FIRST HYPOTHESIS

The results derived from testing my first hypothesis show,
in the foliowing four graphs, that when a stable and successful
I

exchange rate mechanism was installed in 'the EC, coupled with a
strong German economy, EC member nations' inflation rates
declined and converged to German inflation rates.
In the following graphs, part of the analysis uses a
11
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weighted mean of EC members' inflation rates.

Only EC members

that participated in the exchange rate system are included in the
weighted mean.

The weighted average is based upon each country's

percentage share its currency held in the ECU basket as of
October 1990. 3

On the following graphs, the vertical lines are

placed on the years 1972 (snake in place);
place);

.

1979 (EMS in place);
.

Figul~e

Rates:

1976 (mini-snake in

and 1990 (German unification) .

1 (p. 13), ERM Weighted Mean and German Inflat"ion

1971-1990, shows inflation rates of

to inflation rates of Germany.

EP~

members compared

This graph shows Germany's

success at keeping its rate of inflation low, as well as the
decline of the ERM members' weighted mean inflation rate and
convergence to the German inflation rate.

The graph shows that

Germany consistently ensured low rates of inflation by not
allowing its inflation rate to rise above 8%, and for fifteen out
of twenty years keeping it under 5%.

During the ur.successful

years of the snake (1972 to 1976), the ERM members' weighted mean
inflation rate escalated above 16% and diverged from the German
inflation rate.

From 1976 to 1979, the mean inflation rate

declined and began to head for the low German rate.

After the

implementation of the EMS in 1979, the pattern of decline of the
ERM members' inflation rate is strongest.

While the German

inflation rate stayed low, the ERM members' weighted mean
declined, re3ulting in the convergence towards the German
inflation rate.
Figure 2 (p.14) shows the trend of quarterly inflation rates
from 1979 to 1990 for the ERM members and Germany.
12
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•
Figure 1

'ERM WEIGHTED MEAN AND GERMAN
If\JFLATION FtL\TES 1971-1990
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Figure 2

ERM WEIGHTED MEAN AND GERMAN
QUARTERLY INFLATION RATES 79-90
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quarterly inflation rates tend to fluctuate more than annual
rates, the data show that Germany kept a low rate of inflation
before unification.

In addition, the quarterly rates for the ERM

members started out relatively high, but moved downward towards
the German rates.

It is also seen in this graph that

in many of the quarters, the' ERM members' and German inflation
rate moved together.
"

Figure 3 (p.1S) further illustrates the convergence of ERM
inflation rates to German rates.

From 1972 to 1976, the

difference between the ERM members' mean inflation rate and
Germany's inflation rate diverged and over each year grew farther
apart.

From

~976

to 1979, inflation rate convergence began with

a decline in the mean inflation rate's deviation from the German
rate.

The greatest convergence is realized in between 1979 and

1990.

Overall, the mean's deviation from Germany declined during

this period from a high of over 7% in 1980 to a low of nearly 1%
in 1990.

The data on this graph clearly show that inflation

rates of EC member countries converged to German rates under the
EMS.
Support is also found for the first hypothesis by studying
Figure 4 (p.17).

By graphing the standard deviation of inflation

among the EC countries for each year, the conclusions from the
previous graphs are reinforced.

Again, inflation rates diverged

from 1972 to 1976 and after 1979 began to converge.
A statistical test of the standard deviations of inflation
comparing the standard deviation under different exchange rate
mechanisms confirms convergence of inflation rates.
15
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Figure 3
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tailed test about variances of two populations, I compare the
variance from the last year of each exchange rate mechanism
(1975, 1978, and 1990). The last year is used in order to measure

the full effect of each exchange rate system.
comparisons of the variances are made.
is:

F

= variancet/variance~99o,

Pairwise

The relevant F statistic

where t is 1976 and 1978.

The results of these F tests, presented in the following
table, show that there is a statistically significant difference
between the variances of the time periods.

Time Period

F-Statistic

Significance Level

1976 compared
with 1990

7.83

0.05

1978 compared
with 1990

3.48

0.05

The descriptive statistics shown in Figures 1 through 4, as
well as the F test results, support my first hypothesis by
showing a decrease in ERM members' weighted mean inflation rates;
convergence to German rates;

and, a smaller dispersion among

rates over time.
Because Germany kept a consistently low rate of inflation
during this period, the EC members targeted Germany's inflation
rates as their goal.

Germany was a stable anchor to which these

other countries could peg their inflation rates because they were
assured Germany would not inflate.

18

-

B.

SECOND HYPOTHESIS
The second hypothesis states that because unification has

had a destabilizing effect on the German economy, inflation rates
of the EC members diverged from the German inflation rates.

Each

of the following four figures show pre and post German
unification data.

Figure 5 .(p. 20) compares ERM members'

weighted mean inflation rates to those of Germany.

After the

1990 data,. this graph plots quarterly inflation rates, which have
been annualized, from the first quarter of 1991 through the third
quarter of 1993. 4

In quarter one of 1991, there was complete

convergence of inflation rates between the ERM members and
Germany.

Fol~owing

the ERM members' data through the post

unification period shows that after a slight increase in the
average inflation rate, it fell and held steady throughout this
time period.

By studying Germany's data, it is clear that

Germany did not keep a steady rate of inflation after
unification ..

In fact, its inflation rate is fluctuating about

the average ERM rate.

Unlike what is present pre-unification,

post-unificatibn Germany no longer has a consistent inflation
rate and no longer pulls the ERM inflation rate toward its own.
In fact, Germany's inflation rate rises above the average for the
first time since 1971 and it is nearly 4% above the average in
the first quarter of 1993.
Figure 6 (p.21) also demonstrates support for the second
hypothesis.

It shows the ERM weighted mean inflation rate and

the German rate for each quarter from 1979 to 1993.

Like the

previous graph, after unification, Germany's rate fluctuated
19
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Figure 5

'ERM WEIGHTED MEAN AND GERMAN
INFLATION RATES 1971-1993
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Figure 6

ERM WEIGHTED MEAN AND GERMAN
QUARTERLY INFLATIOr".J RATES 79-93
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sporadically around the average Effi1 members' rate.

.

Again, the

differences between pre and post German unification are apparent.
Before unification, quarterly inflation rates of the ERM members
were dram1 towards the lower German rates, and the inflation'
rates between the two moved together.

After complete convergence

of these rates in quarter one of 1991, the ERM members' rates
declined.

G~rmany's

inflation rates fluctuated more and were

consistently higher than the ERM weighted mean inflation rate.
Figure 7 (p.23) shows that after the EC implemented the EMS
';.

in 1979, but before German unification, there is a downward trend
in the mean"s deviation from the German inflation rate, showing
convergence of rates, with complete convergence occurring in the
first quarter of 1991.

After German unification, ther'e is no

longer a trend in the ERM

member~s

deviation from the German

inflation rate, which shows that after unification, Germany is no
longer an anchor for the other EC countries.

These results

demonstrate not only the impact unification has had on Germany's
domestic economy, but also the effect on the EC's inflationary
trends.

Before German unification, Germany's inflation rate was

less than the mean rate.

After unification, the mean inflation

rate is less than Germany's rate, most of the time.

Germany

cannot possibly be serving as an anchor after unification.
Figure 8 (p.24) plots the standard deviation of inflation
rates among the ERM members from 1971 through 1993.

The graph

shows a downward trend of standard deviations beginning in 1979
until unification.

After unification, it shows an upward trend

of standard deviations, indicating an increased dispersion of
22
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Figure 8

STANDARD DEVIATION OF INFLATION
ALL ERM COUNTRIES 1971-1993
9T

---,----..-----..--:------"'------r---------------:

I

7

···················r

,

•

·····,·························t

c

f

.

~ ,~I...........
~

....................}

········r

4

I

~
.

~

3

~

{I)

I

.

··········..

·······1~

.

2

···············f

.

,-I.. .
I

..

.

······t

.

I

.

I

o~--+-----,---r--,---+--r-~l----rl----.---.--.------,-I--r--,---,-,---.--.----+---.----,---,--,.-,-.----.----r-.......,~---.-----.--l71 72 73 74

7~

7e 77

7~3

7g go 91

9"2 93

~24

~~

843 97

~3

Years/Quarters

24

~

90 CJ1

{~2 Q3

Q4 <:)1 02 Gr3

(~4

Q1 Q2 Gr.3

inflation rates.
Applying an F-statistic test of variances shows a
statistically significant difference between the pre and post
unificatiori variances of inflation.

Because the post unification

period has no exact ending point, I calculated one standard
deviation by pooling data over' the last four quarters of the time
period.
For the

(Quarter four of 1992 through quarter three of 1993.)
p~e-unification

time period, I calculated the data in the

same way, by pooling from the four quarters of 1990.
F=variance1990/variance-92-93.

Here,

The test yields an F-statistic of

3.6, which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

This

shows that Germany is no longer the anchor for the other EC
countries.

The rates of inflation are no longer converging to

the German inflation rate.
A regression analysis of the standard deviation data
confirms that the inflation rates converged until unification and
diverged afterwards.

The model is represented by the following

equation:
Standard Deviation

= a+a1Time+~2DummY+~3(Time

x Dummy)

The following definitions explain each variable:
1.

The dependent variable is standard deviation.

This

is the quarterly standard deviation of inflation of all
ERM countries from 1979 through 1993.

2.

a represents the constant.

3.

The Time variable is the quarters (1979-1993),

numbered in consecutive order.
4.

The Dummy variable differentiates between the pre
25
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and post German unification years.

Every quarter from

1979 through 1990 is designated as "0", while each
quarter from 1991 through 1993 is designated as "1".
5.

The Time x Dummy variable is the result of

multiplying, for each quarter, the number in the Time
variable column by' the number in the Dummy variable

.

column .
The fellowing table presents the regression results.
Variable

Estimated Coefficient
'.

Constant(a)

1. 47109

T-Stat

Prob.

17.0878

0.000

Time 031.)

-0.02099

6.8622

0.000

DummY(~2 )

-3.92032

2.5850

0.012

0.08171

2.9019

0.005

TimexDummY(~3)

These results support my two hypotheses.

The pre

unification results are interpreted by examining [,31. which equals

a standard

deviation/a time.

I expect [,31. to be negative because

theory predicts that before unification, inflation rates
converged to German rates and the dispersion among the rates
decreased.

= -0.02099

The result is consistent with this expectation as 01.
and is significant.

represented by

a

the sum of [,31. and

The post unification results are

standard deviation/a time

= [,31.

+ [,33.

I expect

[,33 to be greater than zero, because Germany is

no longer serving as an anchor after unification.

Again, the

regression results are consistent with expectations where [,33 is
significant and the sum of [,31 (-0.02099) and

0.06072.
26
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(0.08171) equals
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The graph entitled Regression Results (p.28) depicts the
trend resulting from running the regression model.

These data

show that before unification, the standard deviation of inflation
of the ERM members declined, showing a convergence of inflation
rates among these countries.

After unification (shown by the

vertical line), an upward tr.end exists, showing an increased
dispersion of inflation rates among the ERM countries.
In copclusion, each graph, F-test, and regression support
both hypotheses.

Together, all of the results show Germany's

strong presence in the EC before unification, as the anchor to
which the other member nations' inflation rates converged.

After

unification, .the German domestic economy has undergone distinct
changes, including increased rates of inflation relative to pre
unification.

With regard to EC members' rate of inflation,

Germany is no longer in the anchor position it was before
unification, and inflation rates are no longer converging to the
German rates of inflation.
IV .

CONCWSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The results confirming the first hypothesis show that as a
stable exchange rate mechanism was put into place in the EC,
coupled with a strong German economy, that inflation :r'ates
declined;

the dispersion among the rates grew smaller;

and,

inflation rates of the EC members converged to the low German
inflation rates. These results support the idea that Germany
served as an anchor for the EC countries.

The results also

confirm the second hypothesis. EC countries' inflation rates
diverged from the German rates after unification. There was
27
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Figure 9
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increased dispersion among inflation rates.

These results

support the idea that Germany is no longer the anchor, with
respect to inflation for the EC countries.
Several questions and implications arise from this lack of
German economic leadership in the Community after unification.
One result of Germany's decreased leadership status is that the
EC's economic and policy making system will become more
symmetricaf'
in the

Though the EC communities may be adversely affected

short~run

as a result of these hardships in unified

Germany, some believe that they may gain more long-term decision
making power in the EC, causing a greater community--wide
coordination of policies (Tsoukalis, 205;

and, Templeman, 51

54).

Perhaps one of the most critical issues resulting from this
diminution of German leadership deals with the future of the EC.
More specifically, because Germany is focusing more on national
interests than on its EC economic interests, is it possible for
monetary union to be implemented in the Community by the proposed
deadline if there is no economic leader in the EC?

Due to the

range of problems in the EC, a committee decided in early August
1993 to abandon the 2.25% band of the ERM and switch to a 15%
band.

This move could inhibit the final phase of monetary union,

which is scheduled to take place in 1997.

For this union to take

place, a prerequisite was established stating that currencies are
required to stay in the 2.25% band for at least two years prior
to union (The Economist, 7 Aug. 1993, 21-22).

Because of these

most recent economic events, it seems the continued integration
29

of the EC is in question.
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1.

I sincerely appreciate the efforts of the following people

without whom the completion
have been possible.

o~

this research project would not

Dr. Pamela Lowry, Assistant Professor of

Economics, directed the independent study portion of this
research, as well as offered her expertise in the field of
International Economics throughout the entire project.
Michael

Dr.

Chair of the Department of Economics, supervised

See~org,

.

this project in its early stages while teaching the Senior
Project class.

Thanks also go to Dr. Margaret Chapman, Associate

Professor of Economics, and Dr. James Simeone, Assistant
Professor of Political Science, members of my honors research
faculty committee, who continually offered guidance and
suggestions during this project.

And a special thanks goes to

Dr. Robert Leekley, Associate Professor of Economics, for his
help in developing the regression model used· in this research
project.

2.

The term fixed exchange rate with a band is taken directly

from International Economics, by Dominick Salvatore.

The

following example illustrates how this type of exchange rate
mechanism works, when the band of fluctuation is 1%.

Ex
?Qr

Value-

(~)

20.2

=2:00
I, q r;

------
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3.

The following table lists each country's percentage share in

the ECU basket as of October 1990 (Harrop, 186).
Germany
France

UK
Italy
Netherlands
Belgium
Spain
Denmark
Ireland
Portugai
Greece
LlLxembourg

4.

30.4%
19.3%
12.6%
9.9%
9.5%
8.2%
5.2%
2.5%
1.1%
0.8%
0.7%
0.3%

The formula for annualizing quarterly rates of inflation is

as follows (Kohn, 125).
(l+periodic rate )PQr:1odQ

pQr

32
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= -l+effective annual rate

References

Anderson, David R., Dennis J. Sweeney, and Thomas A. Williams.
Statistics for Business and Economics. St Paul:
West Publishing Company, 1981.
Barrell, Ray. Economic Convergence and Monetary Union.
Sage Publications, 1992.

London:

Bulmer, Simon and William Paterson. The Federal Republic of
Germanv and the European Community. London: Allen and
Unwin, 1987.
Burstein, Daniel.
1991.

Euroquake.

New York:

Simon and Schuster,

Childs, David. Germany In the Twentieth Century.
HarperCollins Publishers, 1991.

New York:

DSC Data Services Inc. TSM Global Economic Data Base a8 of
December; 1993. Stamford, Connecticut: DSC Data Services,
Inc., 1993.
The Economist.
"Economic Indicators:
5 Feb. 1994 and 20 Mar. 1993.
The Economist.
21-23.

"Europe's Future:

Output, Demand and ,Jobs."

In Their Hands?"

7 Aug.

1993~

Harrop, Jeffrey. The Political Economy of Integration in the
European Community. 2nd ed. Aldershot, England:
Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 1992.
Javetski, Bill.
"No budging at the Bundesbank."
3 Aug. 1992: 34-35.

Business Week

Kohn, Meir. Monev. Banking. and Financial Markets.
2nd ed.
New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1993.
Molle, Willem. The Economics of European Integration.
Aldershot, England: Dartmouth Publication Co., 1990.
Salvatore, Dominick.
International Economics. 3rd ed.
New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1990.
Sandholtz, WaYne.
Maastricht."
1-39.

"Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and
International Organization Winter 1993:

Templeman, John.
"Germany Takes Charge."
17 Feb. 1992: 50-58.
33

Business Week

Tsoukalia, Loukas. The New European Economy.
York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
World Tables 1992 ._
University Press, 1992.

Baltimore:

World Bank.

34

2nd ed.

New

Johns Hopkins

Ann C. Chalstrom
Honors Research Proposal

The Effect of German Unification on Inflation Rates in the
European Community

In my research honors project, I will examine the
inflation rates of the

member~

of the European Community

before and after German unification.

Specifically, I will

show how the inflation rates of the other members converged
with Germany's before urtification.

(Before this, Germany

had low inflation and the other members had

~igh

inflation;

so, they tied their economies to a strong German economy to
help bring inflation under control.)

I will then examine

the consequence of German unification on the inflation rates
of these countries.

The main research hypothesis to be

tested is that Germany lost its ability to keep the
inflation rates of other EC countries in line with its own.
(i.e. There was inflation rate diversion after unification.)
The first step in testing this hypothesis is to collect
macro economic data for EC countries, especially data on
inflation rates.
Bank publications.

Most of the data is available from World
The second step is to develop empirical

models which correlate how closely other EC countries'
inflation rates followed German rates before and after
unification.

The models will attempt to explain trends in

the average European inflation rate as well as trends in the

variation of inflation rates between EC countries.

The main

statistical techniques will be correlation analysis and
regression analysis.

